The democratic government in South Africa has developed a system of social grants to combat the high levels of poverty and inequality inherited from the apartheid regime. With the help of modest economic growth and an associated increase in per capita household income, the introduction and expansion of social grants has helped alleviate the inherited burden of poverty. On the other hand income inequality has remained stubbornly high in post-apartheid South Africa and the role of these grants in inequality reduction remains unclear. We use national household survey data from 1993 and 2008 and the major income inequality decomposition techniques in order to assess the impact of a change in these government transfers on inequality. This South African case study allows for a side-by-side assessment of these income inequality decomposition techniques. We find that the social assistance awarded to the elderly has contributed dramatically to the decline in poverty but has not reduced income inequality. On the other hand social protection programs directed at child minders of poor children had an equalizing effect. More recent decomposition techniques allow us to net out the effect of changes in household composition on inequality from these impacts. This is shown to notably lower the direct impact of the social grants on inequality.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of social grants in reducing income inequality during the first 15 years of democracy in South Africa. Since the transition to democracy in 1994, the South African government has dramatically expanded this system of social grants. Building on an existing but racially biased social security system developed by the apartheid government, the social grant system was expanded to include all races and then, through the 1990s, additional social transfers were instituted.
The reform of the social safety net coupled with increases in per capita household income associated with modest economic growth has reduced poverty levels in the country. However, the very high levels of inequality that were bequeathed as a legacy of apartheid have remained stubbornly high and static income source decomposition work in South Africa suggests that these grants do not and have not reduced inequality. Given the magnitude and apparently e ective targeting of these social grants, this seems incongruous and has to raise the question of whether this result may be more a consequence of the technique rather than the actual operation of the grant system itself. The paper uses the South African situation over the post-apartheid period for a side-by-side assessment of a variety of income source decomposition techniques. It interrogates what insights can be gleaned from each technique about the impact of the extensive and growing social grant system on inequality over this recent period.
Section 2 outlines the relevant survey data employed. Drawing on the rich datasets from 1993 and 2008, a detailed picture is obtained of household income sources and their changes over time. We begin in Section 3 by applying a static, within period decomposition of per capita household income for both periods. This replicates the established result that social grants seem to have a limited impact on the distribution of income. This discussion is followed in Section 4 by the application of a dynamic income decomposition technique, which directly captures the e ect of changes in the composition of income sources on changes in inequality. With the decomposition framed in this way, we find that changes to some of the social grants do indeed appear to have reduced inequality but others do not. In Section 5 we apply a dynamic decomposition to simulate the role of di erent income components in the changing real income distribution. Again we find that changes to some of the social grants appear to have reduced inequality but others do not. These dynamic simulations allow us to disentangle the e ect of changes in household composition on inequality from the impacts of social grants on inequality. However, changes in household composition are shown to notably lower the direct impact of the social grants on inequality.
In the concluding section (6) we look across these techniques. It seems that the large State Old Age Pension scheme, which has played a large poverty reduction role, has not had an equalizing e ect on income inequality. On the other hand a large new program of social grants directed at caregivers of poor children has had an equalizing e ect.
Data
To su ciently assess the impact of government transfers on welfare measures of inequality and poverty adequate data containing comprehensive income measures for all components and for both periods are crucial. For the pre-apartheid period the choice is limited to the Project for Statistic on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD) dataset conducted by South Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town. The PSLSD, was conducted in 1993 in an attempt to overcome the lack of national data collected by the apartheid government as, no nationally representative dataset 1 including all races existed (Wilson, 1995 , PSLSD 1994 . A complex survey design was implemented with sampling executed as a two stage self-weighting approach with Census Sub Enumeration Districts and household as first and second stage units respectively, which can be weighted to be national representative. In contrast the post-apartheid period contains plethora of potential datasets thanks to the data gathering e orts of the strong national statistical o ce, Statistics South Africa, as well as various academic and private research units. The National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) is the preferred dataset of choice as it is conducted in a similar fashion to the PSLSD. A two stage clustering design was implemented in 2008 by first selecting on enumeration level before randomly selecting households within the selected Enumeration Areas (EA) (Leibbrandt et al., 2009) . By taking into account the complex survey designs, nationally representative statistics can be obtained.
Household income can be desegregated into various components such as labour, interest, remittances, agricultural income, State Old Age Pension, child support and other government transfer income. As the focus of this investigation is primarily concerned with the e ects of social assistance from government on income inequality, we place income into four components, labour, State Old Age Pension, other government transfers and other income. Labour income is selected as a separate category due to its dominant share of total income and its e ects on inequality as reported by various previous studies (see Leibbrandt et al. 1996) . It includes all labour market income earned by members of a particular household. Income obtained through the provision of the State Old Age Pension is categorized as pension income. Other government transfer income includes grants such as disability grants, foster care grants, poor relief (in 1993) unemployment insurance and child support. It should be noted that despite its prominence in 2008, the child support grant (CSG) was only introduced in 1998 and, by 2007, reached more than 8 million beneficiaries; making the CSG the largest social assistance program in terms of the number of beneficiaries reached (UNICEF, 2008) . Despite the CSG's prominence it cannot be included as a separate income component as, in 1993, the CSG was not in place and the mean of the CSG will be zero resulting in any welfare indicator's calculation based on the mean intractable. Consequently the CSG is pooled together with other government transfers excluding the State Old Age Pension into the other government transfer category. The share of income from other government transfers excluding the CSG remained fairly stable during the period reporting 0.0306 in 1993 and 0.0331 in 2008. In 2008 the CSG comprised two-thirds (66.40%) of other government income and thus any change attributed to the other government transfer component is mainly driven by the introduction and coverage of the CSG. Income not classified into any of these three categories is aggregated into the other income category. Figure 1 charts the densities of log of total household income per capita with and without government transfers in both 1993 and 2008. The graphs capture the essence of the impact of increased targeting and additional grants on the income distribution in South Africa. In the pre-apartheid period, the addition of government transfers on the income distribution is significant but small. The density of total household income without government transfers lies close to the total household income with government transfers densities. In contrast the post-apartheid period density indicates the e ect of government transfers on the income distribution with various discrepancies particularly in mean and the bulge in the left tail. The left most corner of the density indicates the e ect of government transfer on poverty with the density of household income including transfer lying to the right of the density excluding transfers suggesting that the lowest ranked household according to household income with transfers is better o than the lowest ranked household according to household income without transfers. The contribution of the State Old Age Pension has remained fairly constant overtime and, therefore the majority of the expansion of the 3 social system is due to the introduction of the CSG. To assess the change in each chosen component between the periods our attention is directed to Table 1 which provides the initial descriptive statistics for total household income per capita and, separately, for all four components of per capita income. 2 We present the share of the component in total income, the correlation of each component with total income and two inequality measures for that component. For the total household income, the mean income across the period 1993 and 2008 has increased from 329.7 to 442.1 coupled with an increase in the standard deviation implying a leftward shift in the income distribution between the period accompanied by stretching of the distribution. Income inequality has remained stubbornly high with slight increases as captured by the Gini coe cient from 0.666 to 0.671. Changing household sizes are important to changing per capita incomes. Also, government transfers are granted to particular individuals in households such as the elderly or primary care giver of a child. Thus changes to these demographic variables are a potentially important part of changing contributions from each income source to household income and household income inequality. Descriptive statistics for household composition in each period are provided in Table 2 . Across the period household size decreased from 4.38 to 3.57 with a corresponding change in number of adults a household from 2.7 to 2.1. However, the number of employed adults in a household have decreased with the average share of employed adults decreasing from 0.37 to 0.25. Thus, as described, both the 1993 and 2008 data sets allow for a disaggregation of total household income into a consistently defined set of income components including the State Old Age Pension and other social grants. This allows for the investigation of the impact of social grants on income inequality. The rest of this paper proceeds to interrogate this question making use of a series of income source decompositions. Our particular focus is on what each of these di erent decompositions tells us about this relationship and how it changes over time. 
Static Income Inequality Decompositions by Source
Building on the Shorrocks' (1982) source contribution decomposition, a Gini coe cient decomposition by source was derived by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and Stark et al. (1986) . This provides a static decomposition within period with inter-temporal comparison achieved only by contrasting the results from 1993 to 2008. The e ect of a change in an income source on the Gini coe cient within period can be obtained by taking the derivative of the Lerman and Yitzhak approach as derived by Stark et al. (1986) . The first application of this income decomposition technique on South African data was conducted by Leibbrandt et al. (1996) .
A condensed overview of the derivation of the Lerman and Yitzhaki Decomposition and the extension by Stark et al. (1986) is provided in order to ground the interpretation of the decomposition for both the 1993 and 2008.
In a sample of n households deriving income from K distinct sources or components, let y Let the Gini's mean di erence 3 (A) be defined as:
as per Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) , where a represents the lowest income and b the highest income in the population. Using integration by parts it follows that:
As F is uniformly distributed with mean 1 2 we obtain
As
equation 1 can be rewritten as:
The cov(y k , F ) is the covariance of income component K with the cumulative distribution of income. Dividing (2) by the mean of y the Gini coe cient is obtained:
By multiplying and dividing each component k by cov(y k , F k ) and by µ k as per Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and denoting F (Y k ) as the cumulative rank distribution of income source k, yields the decomposition by source:
Which yields:
where
k is the Gini of component k and thus captures inequality within income component k, R k is the Gini correlation between income component k and total income, similar to the Pearson's correlation, and defined as:
R k will thus be equal to positive when an income component is an increasing function of total income and negative when an income component is a decreasing function of total income and thus lowers the overall Gini coe cient for total income. Thus the e ect of income component k on total income inequality is decomposed into share of the component in total income, the inequality the component and a measure for the correlation between the component and total income.
The e ect of a change in an income source on the Gini coe cient using the Lerman and Yitzhaki approach was developed by Stark et al. (1986) .
The percentage change in inequality due to a change in component k is equal to the initial share of component k in inequality less the share of component k in total income (Stark et al., 1986) . As a result if component k has a negative or zero Gini correlation, R k , a positive change in component k will have an equalizing e ect on inequality. However, if
is negative resulting in an increase in inequality associated with component k. This is due to R k AE 1 (Stark et al., 1986 ). The major disadvantage of this approach is its one dimensionality as it provides a snapshot of drivers of income inequality in a particular period and so is limited in assessing how changes in the components of income have resulted in an aggregate change in equality. Table 3 provides the results for the Lerman and Yitzhaki decompositions in 1993 and 2008. As per equation 3 above, the contribution of each income component to the aggregate Gini coe cient is the product of (a) the share of that component in total income, (b) the inequality in its distribution and (c) the correlation with the distribution of total income. Before we analyse social grants in detail it is worth noting that the main driver of income inequality in both periods is labour income. In 1993 labour income contributed 64% of total income inequality increasing to 73% in 2008. Income from other sources also contributed substantially to total income inequality at 35% and 26% respectively, for 1993 and 2008. Within each period both labour income and income from other sources have strong disequalizing e ects.
With regard to social grants, the decompositions suggest that these grants have either a negligible e ect or small equalizing e ect on total income inequality. In 1993 the pension reports a relative contribution of -0.001 increasing slightly to 0.002 in 2008. Other government transfers report a small negligible e ect of -0.0001 in 1993 becoming more equalizing in 2008 reporting a relative contribution of -0.001. Despite the large inequality within the distribution of the government transfer components which should favour the less fortunate, the small share of total income of these sources results in a small e ect on total income inequality. Government transfers appear to reverse some of the disequalizing e ects of labour income, However, their impact is quite small.
The small shares of government income characterizing the 1993 period are attributed to the modest social assistance system present in South Africa at the time. In 2008 the State Old Age Pension reports a smaller share of total income (0.052). However, the expansion of the social assistance mainly through the CSG is captured by the increase of the share of other government income's share in total income increasing to 0.065. The importance of income from government assistance with respect to total income has increased between the periods due to an increase in other government transfer income while the significance of labour income has also increased between the periods.
With regard to the Gini coe cient of each source (G k ), both forms of government assistance report high levels of inequality in both periods. The State Old Age Pension reports a Gini coe cient of 0.8 in 1993 and 0.81 in 2008. Other government income reports a Gini coe cient of 0.955 in 1993 decreasing dramatically to 0.601 in 2008. The high inequality in the distribution of government grants is understandable, as many individuals do not receive government assistance, reporting zero income from such sources resulting in an unequal distribution of the component. In line with this, it is most likely the expansion of the social assistance system through the CSG that brought down the Gini coe cient for this component.
Then, with regard to the correlation of grant income to the distribution of total income (R k ), Table 3 reports that these correlations are low or negative for income from social grants. The Old Age Pension reports a correlation of -0.008 in 1993 and 0.06 in 2008 while 9 other government income reports a correlation in -0.09 and -0.014 in 2008 respectively. As grant income is means-tested and supposed to target the poor, the negative coe cient is a good thing. A priori we would expect these income sources to be strongly negative. We do not find this strong negative relationship.
Applying the Stark et al. (1986) extension, the impact of a 1% increase in an income component on total income inequality can be assessed. In both 1993 and 2008 small increases in social assistance lead to decreases in income inequality as measured by the Gini coe cient. Both the pension and other government income have such negative results for a 1% increase in the particular component for 1993 and 2008. In 1993 a 1% increase in the pension would lead to a -0.052 decrease in income inequality as measured by the Gini with a corresponding -0.027 decrease in 2008 while other government transfer income has values of -0.009 and -0.066 in 1993 and 2008 respectively. These findings are driven by the negative correlation (R k ) coe cient obtained for these income sources. Thus, this marginal change analysis does reveal a stronger redistributive impact of the social grants than the static decompositions. However" a note of caution about this approach is in order. This analysis hinges on the assumption that all other components remain unchanged. The validity of this assumption is questionable as an increase in labour income might disqualify an individual from obtaining means tested government assistance.
The most important limitation of this static decomposition is that it does not directly explore the impact of changes in state transfers on changes in inequality. This makes the analysis usefully suggestive but not more than this. We now go on to look at some more recent decomposition approaches that focus directly on the changes in inequality that result from changes in income sources including social grants. 
Dynamic Decompositions
The Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) decompositions fall short of providing insights into changes in welfare indicators over time due to changes in an income component. The expansion of the South African government social assistance system from 1993 to 2008 resulted in changes in sources. In order to capture the impact of the extension of the social assistance on inequality a di erent approach is required. Wan (2001) derives a framework that decomposes the change in the Gini coe cient by income components allowing for dynamic changes to be assessed.
Following Wan (2001) let the discrete Gini be denoted as G d , and given by the decomposition:
where P is a 1 ◊ N row vector of shares of income receiving units, I is a N ◊ 1 column vector of income shares and Q is a N ◊ N matrix with zero on the diagonal, +1 in the upper triangular region (i < j) and ≠1 on the lower triangular region (j > i) as per Silber (1989) . The decomposition in equation 4 can be applied to component k Õ s Gini coe cient, G k , as follows: 
where µ k is the mean of component k and µ is the mean of total household per capita income, and thus the Gini can be interpreted as the weighted concentration index of each components with the share of each component acting as weights. For simplicity let S k = µ k µ and thus:
Using subscripts t and t + 1 to indicate the two time periods, the change in G d can be obtained from equation 5:
Allowing delta, , to specify the di erence between two periods we obtain:
Which can be rewritten as:
Equation 6 decomposes changes in the Gini into three unique terms: changes in income shares, S k C k,t , changes in concentration index, C k , S k,t and the interaction of these two e ects, C k S k labeled as the Structural E ect, Real Inequality E ect and Interactive E ect respectively (Wan, 2001) . Table 4 provides the results of the Wan (2001) dynamic decomposition approach of income components for the Gini coe cient for the period spanning 1993 to 2008. The table presents the structural e ects due to changes in income shares ( S k C k,t ), the real inequality e ects due to changes in income concentration indices ( C k , S k,t ) and the interaction e ects ( C k S k ) as outlined in equations 6. Source: Authors' Calculations using NIDS and PSLSD weighted.
The structural e ects are driven by the change of a component's share of total income( S k ) and the baseline inequality within the income component captured by the concentration index of the component in question (C k ) in the initial period. Over the period pension and other government transfers have had an equalizing structural e ect. However, these e ects are small at -0.001 and -0.016 respectively. The structural e ects are dominated by labour and other income e ects both in magnitude and signs. Both of these sources are found to have disequalising structural e ects while the income from both government transfers have equalizing structural e ects. Over the period 1993 to 2008 the change in labour income has lead to a disequalizing (positive) structural e ect of 0.024 while income from other sources has had a similar disequalizing structural e ect of 0.075. As previously mentioned, Table 1 provides the shares and Gini coe cients of the various components. Both labour income and income from other sources report high levels of within source inequality. Unlike labour income whose share of total income has increased during the period, the share of income from other sources has decreased during the period.
The real income inequality e ect, which is driven by changes in within-component inequality and the share of the component of total income, indicate similar trends to the structural e ects. Labour income and income from other sources are found to be disequalizing while the pensions and other government transfers are found to be equalizing. Pensions and other government income report equalizing e ects of -0.016 and -0.003 respectively. However" similar to the structural e ects, the real inequality e ects are overwhelmed both in magnitude and sign by income from other sources and labour income. On the other hand changes in the labour income component across the period lead to a real income inequality e ect of 0.138 while other income reported a real income inequality e ect of 0.159.
Finally the interaction of the two e ects indicates equalizing e ects for labour income, other government transfers and other income. Interestingly the interaction of pension income indicates a small disequalizing e ect on total income during the period.
The full contribution of changes in an income component during the period is obtained by summing the above mentioned e ects. Importantly, changes in both pension income and income from other government transfers during the period are shown to have had equalizing e ects on total income of -0.011 and -0.043 respectively. The equalizing effect obtained from changes in social assistance during the period is undone by the large disequalizing e ect from changes in labour income and income from other sources. The change in labour income during the period has had a disequalizing e ect on total income inequality of 0.152. Similarly changes in income from other sources have also had a disequalizing e ect on total income of 0.189.
The application of the Wan (2001) approach has allowed us to assess the e ects of changes of income components across the period on changes in total income inequality. Labour income and income from other sources dominate the aggregate e ect. Their disequalizing e ects result in an increase in overall income inequality. The changes in social grants are found to have equalizing e ects on total income. Also the decomposition adds some relevant detail in showing that both the increasing shares of income from social grants and their narrowing inequality were responsible for their equalizing contributions. However" this is not as clean as one would like it to be as the interaction term involves some element of both.
Thus, at the end of the day while the aggregate impacts of each source is useful, we are left with the problem of disentangling the impact of the important components of the changes in social grant income within a dynamic decomposition. Besides the changing shares of grants and the intra-component inequality there are two other important components. The first is the change in the targeting of grants. The static decomposition highlighted the importance of the correlation between grant income and total income as a signal for whether grants are e ectively targeted at the bottom of the distribution. Grants can become more equalizing if they become more tightly targeted at the bottom of the distribution. Second, as we are measuring the inequality of per capita incomes, changes in inequality could be due to changes in household size and composition. This possibility is important in its own right. In the context of this paper, it is especially important to net out these demographic e ects from the e ects of the income components. Up to this point, the techniques have not allowed for this possibility, thereby implicitly attributing these demographic e ects to the income sources. In the next section we introduce more recent simulation-based work that shows some promise in terms of unravelling these components.
Dynamic Decompositions using Simulations
Despite the dynamic nature of the Wan (2001) approach, which decomposes the changes in the Gini coe cient during the period by accounting for the changes in the various income sources, it does not isolate the impact of a change in an income source on inequality. In an ideal situation, the impact of the extension of the social grant system in South Africa between 1993 and 2008 would be assessed against a counterfactual of an unchanged 1993 system operating in 2008. A novel approach by Barros et al. (2006) investigates the determinants of inequality across a period based on a series of counterfactual simulations in an attempt to quantify the contribution of changes in demographics, social assistance and labour income.
In order to assess the drivers a ecting the change in wellbeing as measured by inequality, we follow the approach outlined by Barros et al. (2006) , Azevedo et al. (2013a) and Azevedo et al. (2013b) . Following the notation from the previous sections,
and y
y ik which can be rewritten as:
where y pc ik is the household per capita income of component k. For simplicity sake decompose income (y i ) into only two sources and name these sources grants (G) and non-grants (NG) income thus letting k = G, N G. Equation 7 can thus be rewritten as
The cumulative density function of household income per capita, F(.) is thus dependent on the factors outlined in equation 8, namely government income (y i, G ) and non-government income (y i, N G ). Let Ë be any welfare indicator of inequality which is dependent on the distribution of income and thus the factors outlined. Ë is now given by:
In order to assess the impact of a change in a component (k) of the income distribution F(.), between two periods, on a particular welfare indicator of inequality, a counterfactual income distribution is required for the second period where the component in question is left unchanged. However, as no such distribution exists, Barros et al. (2006) constructs counterfactual distributions for the second period given that the distributions of per capita income is known in both periods. For a change in a particular component, say y i, N G , the indicator is calculated for the first and second period based on the income distribution F(.). In addition, the 1993 real values of the component, y pc , NG , is substituted into the income distribution of the second period resulting in:
Ë ≠Ë simulates the impact of the change in that component on inequality. It is the simulation equivalent of the total e ect from Wan's decomposition. However, as y pc ik is the household per capita income of component k, the e ect to household compositional changes on welfare indicators has not been explicitly taken into account. One benefit of this simulation approach is that the impact of changes in household composition can be simulated too. To account for this equation 7 can be written as:
where n a is the number of adults in household i. Consequently equation 11 is now defined as:
Which can be further extended by letting n o denote the number of employed adults in household i:
The factors a ecting the cumulative density function of household income per capita, F(.) is now government income (y i, G ) and non-government income (y i, N G ) as well as the number of adults per household (n a ), number of employed adults per household (n o ), number of household members (n). Ë, which is dependent on the distribution of income and thus the factors outlined, is now given by:
For a change in a particular component, say y i, N L , the indicator is calculated for the first and second period based on the income distribution F(.) resulting in equation 13 being written as:Ë
The contribution of a change in non-grant income of household i is given by the di erence between the actual observed welfare indicator Ë in period 2 and the estimated welfare indicatorË in period 1 as captured by equation 9 and 10 or equation 13 and 14 depending on the treatment of household compositional factors.
In the absence of panel data, substitution of a particular component between periods becomes complex as the same households are not observed in subsequent periods. Following Azevedo et al. (2013a) a rank-preserving transformation to assign first-period characteristics to the second period is employed by ordering households by per capita household income and dividing the population into quantiles. The mean of each component listed for each quantile can then be substituted by its corresponding quantile in the previous period. Thus, to assess the impact of a change in grant income, households are ranked in both periods according to household income per capita and placed into quantiles. The value of grant income in period 1 is then substituted for the value of grant income in period 2 across corresponding quantiles in order to obtain equation 14. So, for example, by inserting 1993 real values one would be removing the values embodying the roll out and implementation of the CSG from 2008 data. It is the comparison of inequality measured with these simulated data with the actual 2008 inequality that then provides the estimate of the impact that this income source has had on inequality. Households may also be ranked by the components themselves in order to provide insights into the impact of a change in distribution of the particular component has on a welfare indicator. If a component is highly correlated with total household income per capita the rankings of households may not di er when ordered accordlying to the component as oppose to total household income per capita. However, as is likely with the roll out of the CSG, there will be changes to which parts of the distribution are receiving the income from these sources. This re-ordering process enables us to separate out the changes in the real value of the income from this source from changes in targeting of this income within the distribution.
As it is unlikely that only one component has changed between periods, all components should be substituted across periods in a successive manner such that first component 1 is substituted and the indicator calculated, followed by the additional substitution of the 2nd component and so on. However, the choice of order of indicators to be substituted in, impacts the results. Several remedies for this path dependence have been proposed in the micro-decomposition literature (see Essama-Nssah 2012 and Ferreira 2010) . Following Azevedo et al. (2013a) the Shapley solution is followed; that is, the e ect is calculated across all possible paths. Thus all decomposition paths in every possible order are calculated and the e ect per component is averaged across paths.
The implementation of equations 9 and 10, which allows for straightforward application of the Barros et al. (2006) method without explicitly accounting for household compositional factors can be used as a benchmark for additional output. Table 5 presents the results of the Barros et al. (2006) approach for the period 1993 to 2008.
Similar to the findings of the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and Wan (2001) approach, Labour income is found to have a disequalizing e ect. Between the period 1993 to 2008 labour income has resulted in an increase in total income inequality by increasing the Gini coe cient by .011 units (1.7%). Interestingly income from the State Old Age Pension is shown to have a disequalizing e ect resulting in an increasing Gini coe cient by .026 units (3.9%). On the other hand income from other government transfers has an equalizing effect; decreasing the Gini coe cient by -.044 (-6.6%). The total impact of government transfers on income inequality during the period is thus equalizing as the net e ect of the two income components is -0.014 (-2.1% ). Similar to the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and Wan (2001) , income from other sources is found to have a disequalizing e ect report- ing a positive contribution to increasing the Gini coe cient by .008 units. Despite the equalizing e ects of other government transfers and income from other sources the large disequalizing e ect of labour income results in a small net increase during the period. At this stage of the application of the Barros et al. (2006) approach it is comparable to the Wan (2001) approach. Both approaches indicate that labour income is disequalizing while transfers from other government income is found to be equalizing. However, where the Wan (2001) approach found the pension to be equalizing and other income to be disequalizing, the Barros et al. (2006) approach find the opposite e ects for the two components.
The Barros et al. (2006) approach allows us to delve into these aggregate changes and separate out the contribution of demographics. In addition we can re-rank the observations by a component's distribution as opposed to the distribution of total income in order to evaluate the impact of changes in the distribution of each component. For social grants the re-ranking according to the grants distribution allows us to gauge the impact of changes in targeting of social grants on total income inequality. Table 6 provides the results from implementing all of these changes; in other words, equations 13 and 14.
Early in the paper we presented Table 1 to provide key demographic statistics for both 1993 and 2008. To recap, household size decreased slightly from mean size of 4.87 to 3.57. Alarmingly, the number of employed adults in a household decreased from 0.36 in 1993 to 0.25 in 2008. Table 6 show that this change in the number of employed adults has had a disequalizing e ect on income inequality contributing to an increase in the Gini of .034 units. Despite the slight decrease in the number of adults in a household the share of adults in a household decreased from 4.4 in 1993 to 3.6 in 2008. As per Table 6 this has had a small disequalizing e ect on total income inequality of .002. Table 5 indicated that the share of employed adults decreased from 0.479 in 1993 to 0.309 in 2008. This had a small disequalizing e ect on income inequality as indicated in Table 6 . Collectively, the impact of these demographic changes on total income inequality has been equalizing; reporting a net e ect of -0.011 (-0.01-0.02+0.011+0.008).
Having netted out these demographic e ects, we now go back to look at the income components. Once accounting for the changes in demographics the equalizing e ect of labour income is slight reduced to only -.012 units (1.8%). Incomes from other sources are found to be disequalizing; increasing the Gini by .003 units (0.4%). Interestingly income from the State Old Age Pension remains slightly disequalizing increasing the Gini by .016 units (2.4%). Income from other government transfers had an equalizing e ect on total income inequality. Changes in income from other government transfers during the period 1993 to 2008 resulted in a decrease in the Gini of -.035 units. The changes in targeting, as expressed by changes in the distribution of income from other government income, occurring during 1993 and 2008 decreased the Gini by -.027 (-4%). The impact of changes in social grants on inequality during 1993 to 2008 has been equalizing with a negative net e ect decreasing the Gini coe cient by -0.019 (-.035+0.016) (-2.8%).
The application of the Barros et al. (2006) approach has allowed for a more nuanced approach to evaluating the impact of changes to social grant income on changes to income inequality. In sum the approach aims to isolate the direct impact of a change in an income source on the total income inequality by providing a simulated counterfactual thus accounting for both the dynamic nature and need for a counterfactual. One of the novelties of Barros et al. (2006) is in its ability to tease out the impact of demographical changes on income inequality. Demographical changes in South Africa, such as the number of adults and employed adults in a household, have had a small disequalizing e ect on income inequality in South Africa. Once this e ect is netted out, the income components are then ascertained, net of this e ect. Similar to the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and Wan (2001) labour income is found to have a disequalizing e ect on income inequality while social grants have an equalizing e ect. Re-ranking the distributions by income components themselves has indicated the equalizing e ect an increase in target of grants has had on income inequality.
Conclusion
The introduction and expansion of social grants by the democratic government in South Africa has led to a decrease in poverty. However" until now the e ect of this expansion on inequality has remained elusive. Given the positive poverty reduction impact and the fact that the expansion of social grants has been large, there is a prior assumption that these cash transfers have been equalizing. This prior view is strengthened by density plots of total household per capita income with and without social grants that show a substantial income contribution at the bottom of the income distribution.
We have applied a variety of decomposition techniques which assess the contribution to inequality of each component of total per capita income. The development of such techniques have taken into account dynamic changes as well as the need for a suitable counterfactual constructed through simulations. In addition allowance has been made for demographical changes and the ability to analyze changes in the targeting of grants resulting in a rich decomposition of income inequality.
Looking across the results it appears that social assistance awarded to the elderly has had little e ect on equality. Changes in the targeting of the state pension have lead to a small disequalizing e ect. However, additional social protection programs initiated in the post-apartheid period have had an equalizing e ect. Part of this e ect is due to the fact that these grants are well targeted. Disentangling the demographic e ects lowers the direct impact of social grants and all income sources on inequality.
Social grants have made contributions to reducing South Africa's stubbornly high inequality. However, with income inequality still relatively high a greater e ort to reduce inequality is required.
In terms of methodology, advances in decomposition analysis have taken us quite far down the road of answering questions about the e ects of the ambitious post-apartheid policy on social grants. We could deduce that, in line with priors, the roll out of these grants has been equalizing. We could go further and net out the impacts of changes in household size and household composition from the impacts of changes to the income sources. Then, within each income source we were able to separately ascertain the portion of the aggregate impact that is due to the changing size of the grant and the targeting of the grant. Through this we learn that even though the child support grant makes a small contribution to total income this contribution has increased substantially over the post-apartheid period and when this is combined with the fact that it is well targeted at the bottom of the income distribution, it leads to have a notable impact on reducing inequality. In contrast the very large State Old Age Pension has not had a big impact on reducing inequality. A version of this program was in place at the start of the post-apartheid period. Thus, its changing importance as an income source was unspectacular and, in fact, mildly negative in real terms. Then, the changes in its targeting reveal a slight worsening. Thus, it is assessed as worsening inequality by a small amount.
This is an appropriate concluding point as it draws attention to a remaining limitation in both old and new income source decomposition techniques. Given the striking before and after densities, it is hard to believe that the State Old Age Pension really makes 20 very little di erence. However" these techniques are not equipped to handle before and after scenarios. In the static case, the decomposition really examines the impact of the pension in an ex post sense; i.e., only after it has already made many of the poor better o . In the dynamic case, the fact that some version of state pension policy was already in place in the base year is crucial to the analysis of changes. At the same time, if the policy is not there at all, it is impossible to do an analysis of changes. Thus, none of the decompositions are assessments of the before and after comparisons naively pictured in the densities. Moreover, these decompositions need to be imbedded in a good deal of complementary analysis to really add value.
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